1. Introduction Lancaster (1973) described capitaliam as a differential game between workera end capitalista in which the workers determine their share of consumption in total output whereas the capitalista divide the remainder over investment and their own consumption. The purpoae was to show the dynamic inefficiency of capitalism by comparing the noncooperative Nash outcome with the social optimum. Hcel (19~8) extended this analysis by considering the whole set of Pareto efficient solutions. Pohjola (1983) 
JO
The capital accumulation can be written as
The differential game (1)- (3) is called the Lancaster model of capitalism.
Suppose that the workers are the leader in the Stackelberg game and the capitalists are the follower. The Hamiltonien function for the rational reaction of the capitalists is given by
Pontryagin's maximum principle yields the neceseary conditions (3),
According to Arrow's sufficiency theorem ( see e.g. Seieratad and Sydsaeter, 1987, p. 107) these conditions are also sufficient. The costate y2 is con-
tinuous, and monotonically decreasing because yZ(t) ( 0, t E(O,T).
3 It follows that there are two poasibilities:
(1) Y2 (0) 5 1 In this case uZ(t) -0, t E(O,T], so that there is no investment end no capital accumulation. This can occur when the workers claim e too large consumption rate for themselvea or when there is too little time to take advantage of the investment. The adjoint system (6) yielda that the integral of ul over the time interval [O,T] must be bigger than or equsl to T-1 e' For T sufficiently large (T ) a lb ) this case can be ruled out, because
(2) Y2(0)~1 .
In this case there is a point in time t2 with y2(t2)~1 where the capitalists switch from full investment uz(t) a 1, t E [O,t2), to no in-
The rational reaction of the capitalists leads to the following constraints for the maximisation problem of the workera:
(i) before t2 there is capital accumulation according to
and after t2 the capital stock is fixed:
(ii) after t2 the consumption rate uI has to satiafy
The objective functional of the workers becomes 4 t2
( ul(t)aK(t) dt t{a(T -t2) -1}K(t2).

Jo E (o.t2). Y1 E [o,t2).
The workers have to choose ul(t), t E[o,t2], end t2 E (o,T) in order to maximise (9) subject to (7), and have to satiafy the constraint (8 
Jll c, yl(t) ) 1,
91(t) --{ullt) i yl(t)[1-ul(t)]}8.
yl ( 
is monotonically met, so that there i s a multiwith the workera as leader: In contrast to what ia presented in table 4 (Pohjola, 1983, p. 183) . the costate z (Pohjola, 1983. equation (24)) is constant and equal to -yl(t2)K(t2) on the whole time interval (tZ,T] (see e.g. Gel'fand and Shilov, 1964) . Note that the costate yl here is not the same as in section 2 of this comment. It follows that the switching function B (Pohjola, 1983, equation (27) ) is constant and equal to One can proceed as follows. The adjoint systems for y2 and yl (Pohjola, 1983. equationa (19) and (23) There are three possibilities:
(1) B(t) ) 0, t E(t2.T] or yl(t2) C 1, so that ul(t)~b, t E(t2,T].
This leads to a contradiction with b) 0.5. Furthermore, it ia shown that it is not necessary to employ optimal control theory in the space of generalised functions, becauae the problem of the leader can be seen as a simple optimal control problem with a scrap value and a variable final time.
